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2 Henri Pagès, Dylan Possamaï
1 Introduction
Following the seminal contributions of DeMarzo and Fishman [9], [10] and
Sannikov [18], there has been a renewed interest in the mathematical treatment
of continuous-time moral hazard models and their applications. In a typical
moral hazard situation, a principal (who takes the initiative of the contract)
is imperfectly informed about the action of an agent (who accepts or rejects
the contract). The goal is to design a contract that maximizes the utility of
the principal while that of the agent is held to a given level.
In its whole generality, the mathematical treatment of the problem can be cast
as follows. Agency problems stemming from the agent’s hidden action a limit
the utility this agent can get from contracting with the principal. The optimal
contract specifies how these limitations should be strenghtened or slackened
over time as a result of the agent’s ongoing performance. We first have to solve
the agent’s problem for a given contract c
VA(c) := sup
a
E [UA(c, a)] ,
where UA is the utility function of the agent. If we assume for simplicity that
there exists a unique optimal action a(c) for any c, a point on the set of
constrained Pareto optima can be found by solving the Principal’s stochastic
control problem
VP := sup
c
{E [UP (c, a(c))] + λE [UA(c, a(c))]} ,
where UP is the utility function of the principal and λ is the Lagrange multi-
plier associated to some reservation utility of the agent.
Because of the almost limitless choices for c, it is generally assumed that the
agent does not have complete control over the outcomes but instead conti-
nuously affects their distribution by choosing specific actions. This actually
means that the agent affects the probability measure Pa under which the above
expectations are taken. This setting, which will be described more rigorously
in the following section, corresponds to a weak formulation of the stochastic
control problem.
As shown in [6], a general theory can be used to solve these problems, by
means of forward-backward stochastic differential equations. We show here
how recursive, martingale representation-based techniques proposed by Sanni-
kov [18] can be brought to bear on the issue to yield explicit solutions that are
easy to derive. The paper is a companion to Pagès [17], who contributes to the
optimal design of securitization in the presence of banks’ impaired incentives
to monitor. It provides a coherent mathematical framework for this problem
and lays down the rigorous foundations for the formal derivations sketched in
[17].
Our point is to show that the martingale approach to contracting can be exten-
ded to a Markovian setting, which makes it possible to relax the assumption
A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives 3
of conditional independence between default times. There are now papers on
jump processes as opposed to diffusions, but to the best of our knowledge they
only deal with Poisson risk. In the theory of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring, Abreu et al. [1] use Poisson signals to vary the frequency with
which actions are taken, and show that the optimal provision of incentives is
markedly different should the signals be interpreted as “good” or “bad” news.
Sannikov and Skrzypacz [20] find in a continuous-time setting, with both Brow-
nian information and Poisson jumps associated with bad news, that deviations
from cooperative behavior can only be punished when the discontinuous in-
formation is revealed. This echoes former results in [19], according to which
collusion is impossible under imperfect monitoring with Brownian informa-
tion, as the risk of triggering a punishment when no deviation occurs is large.
A model close to ours is Biais et al. [4], who deal with large and unfrequent
Poisson losses suffered by a firm that invests in a stationary environment. They
show that an optimal way to restore incentives when performance is poor is
to downsize the project at any time there is a loss.
Intensity-based models have been widely used in risk management. Here we
focus on a contagion model with interacting default intensities. Frey and Back-
haus [11] show how such models can be conveniently embedded into a Mar-
kovian framework. Under this approach, a Markov chain is defined on the set
of all default configurations which, when names are exchangeable, simply boil
down to the portfolio default count, and default intensities are explicit func-
tions of time and the portfolio default state, as exemplified by [7], [14] and
[21] in the credit field. Markov chains have recently been shown to simplify
the task of pricing and hedging credit risk, as in Kraft and Steffensen [15] or
Laurent et al. [16]. They are also useful in our context, as they provide an
alternative way of tackling problems of optimal contracting, 1 even though the
conditions under which explicit solutions can be derived are not warranted a
priori.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall the model
laid out in [17], describe the contracts and give our main assumptions. In
Section 3, we formally derive a candidate optimal contract by solving the HJB
equation associated to the control problem. We then use a standard verification
argument to show that the candidate solution is indeed the optimal contract
and provide a numerical example. The paper concludes with a short section
devoted to a simple special case.
1. With a more complex time dependence, such as the self-exciting Hawkes formulation
of [2], [3] or [12], it may not be possible to construct a Markov chain describing the jump of
each portfolio constituent. The availability of martingale representation results would then
be questionable.
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2 The model
2.1 Notations and preliminaries
We consider a model with universal risk neutrality in which time is continuous
and indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). Without loss of generality, the risk-free interest
rate is taken to be 0. A bank has a claim to a pool of I unit loans indexed by
i = 1, . . . , I which are ex ante identical. Each loan is a defaultable perpetuity
yielding cash flow µ per unit time until it defaults. Once a loan defaults it
gives no further payments. The infinite maturity and no recovery assumptions
are made for tractability.
Denote by
Nt =
I∑
i=1
1{τ i≤t},
the sum of individual loan default indicators, where τ i is the default time
of loan i. The current size of the pool is I − Nt. Since all loans are a priori
identical, they can be reindexed in any order after defaults. The action of
the bank consists in deciding at each time t whether it monitors any of the
outstanding loans. These actions are summarized by the functions eit such
that for 1 ≤ i ≤ I − Nt, eit = 1, if loan i is monitored at time t, and eit = 0
otherwise.
Non-monitoring renders a private benefit B > 0 per loan and per unit time
to the bank. The opportunity cost of monitoring is thus proportional to the
number of monitored loans.
The rate at which loan i defaults is controlled by the hazard rate αit specifying
its instantaneous probability of default conditional on history up to time t.
Individual hazard rates are assumed to depend both on the monitoring choice
of the bank and on the size of the pool. Specifically, we choose to model the
hazard rate of a non-defaulted loan i at time t as
αit = αI−Nt
(
1 + (1− eit)ε
)
, (2.1)
where the parameters {αj}1≤j≤I represent individual “baseline” risk under
monitoring when the number of loans is j and ε is the proportional impact of
shirking on default risk.
We define the shirking process k by
kt =
I−Nt∑
i=1
(
1− eit
)
,
which represents the number of loans that the bank fails to monitor at time t.
Then, according to (2.1), aggregate default intensity is given by
λkt = αI−Nt (I −Nt + εkt) . (2.2)
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The bank can fund the pool internally at a cost r ≥ 0. It can also raise
funds from a competitive investor who values income streams at the prevailing
riskless interest rate of zero. We assume that both the bank and investors
observe the history of defaults and liquidations.
2.2 Description of the contracts
Contracts are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by investors to the bank and
agreed upon at time 0. They determine how cash flows are shared and how
loans are liquidated, conditionally on past defaults and liquidations. Without
loss of generality, they specify that an investor receives cash flows from the
pool and makes transfers to the bank. We denote by D = {Dt}t≥0 the càd-
làg, positive and increasing process describing cumulative transfers from the
investors to the bank, such that
EP [Dτ ] < +∞, (2.3)
where τ is the liquidation time of the pool and where we assume that D0 = 0.
Remark 2.1 For certain interpretations, it will be useful to let D have a jump
at time 0 (cf. Remark 3.10).
Let then Ht := 1{t≥τ} be the liquidation indicator of the whole pool. The
contract specifies the probability θt with which the pool is maintained given
default (dNt = 1), so that at each point in time
dHt =
{
0 with probability θt,
dNt with probability 1− θt.
With our notations,the hazard rates associated with the default and liquida-
tion processes Nt and Ht are λkt and (1− θt)λkt , respectively.
The contract also specifies when liquidation occurs. We assume that liquida-
tions can only take the form of the stochastic liquidation of all loans following
immediately default. The above properties translate into
P
(
τ ∈ {τ1, ..., τ I}) = 1, and P(τ = τ i|Fτ i , τ > τ i−1) = 1− θτ i .
We summarize the above details of the contracts, which are completely speci-
fied by the choice of (D, θ). Each infinitesimal time interval (t, t+ dt) unfolds
as follows :
– I −Nt loans are performing at time t.
– The bank chooses to leave kt ≤ I −Nt loans unmonitored and monitors the
I −Nt − kt others, enjoying private benefits ktB dt.
– The investor receives (I −Nt)µdt from the cash flows generated by the pool
and pays dDt ≥ 0 as fees to the bank.
– With probability λkt dt defined by (2.2) there is a default (dNt = 1).
– Given default the pool is maintained (dHt = 0) with probability θt or liqui-
dated (dHt = 1) with probability 1− θt.
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2.3 Economic assumptions
In this section we make some assumptions arising from economic considera-
tions (see [17] for details). They are in force throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.1
µ ≥ αI . (2.4)
This condition ensures that monitored loans are profitable viewed as of time
0.
Assumption 2.2 We have for all j ≤ I
r
αj
≤ µε−B
B
ε
1 + ε ,
The condition is related to the efficiency of monitoring and ensures that the
benefits for a non-monitoring bank are not so high that shirking is socially
preferable.
Assumption 2.3 Individual default risk is non-decreasing with past default
αj ≤ αj−1, for all j ≤ I. (2.5)
The condition introduces the possibility of correlated defaults through a conta-
gion effect, as individual loans’ intensity of default may increase with the ar-
rival of new defaults.
The expected surplus that can be extracted from the pool of loans is
S = E
[∫ ∞
0
(I −Nt)µdt
]
− I = E
 I∑
j=1
∫ ∞
0
jµ1{I−Nt=j} dt
− I
= I (µ/αI − 1) , (2.6)
which is positive under Assumption 2.1. Indeed, investors could commit I to
the pool, pay the bank D0 = S at time 0, and instruct it to choose k = 0 until
the default of the last loan. They would break even from (2.6). We assume
that the bank’s monitoring decision is not observable. This leads to a dynamic
moral hazard problem, as the bank may choose kt > 0 down the road to reap
the private benefits ktB. The contract (D, θ) must use observations on defaults
to give the bank incentives to monitor. We assume that both the bank and
investors can fully commit to such a contract.
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3 Optimal contracting
Before going on, let us now describe the stochastic basis on which we are wor-
king. We will always place ourselves on a probability space (Ω,F,P) on which
N is a Poisson process with intensity λ0t (which is defined by (2.2)) and where
P is the reference probability measure. We denote (FNt )t≥0) the completed na-
tural filtration of N and by (Gt)t≥0 the minimal filtration containing (FNt )t≥0)
and that makes the liquidation time of the pool τ a G-stopping time. We note
that this filtration satisfies the usual hypotheses, and therefore we will always
consider super or submartingales in their càdlàg version.
3.1 Incentive compatibility and limited liability
As recalled in the introduction, in order to make the problem tractable, we
assume that the monitoring choices of the bank affect the distribution of the
size of the pool. To formalize this, recall that, by definition, the shirking process
k is G-predictable and bounded. Then, by Girsanov Theorem, we can define a
probability measure Pk equivalent to P such that
Nt −
∫ t
0
λkt ds,
is a Pk-martingale.
More precisely, we have from Brémaud [5] (Chapter VI, Theorem T3) that on
Gt
dPk
dP
= Zkt ,
where Zk is the unique solution of the following SDE
Zkt = 1 +
∫ t
0
Zks−
(
λks
λ0s
− 1
)(
dNs − λ0sds
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P− a.s.
Then, given a contract (D, θ) and a shirking process k, the bank’s expected
utility at t = 0 is given by
uk0(D, θ) := EP
k
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dDt +Bkt dt)
]
, (3.1)
while that of the investor is
vk0 (D, θ) := EP
k
[∫ τ
0
(I −Nt)µdt− dDt
]
. (3.2)
Following Sannikov [18], we give now the definition of an incentive-compatible
shirking process.
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Definition 3.1 A shirking decision k is incentive-compatible with respect to
the contract (D, θ) if it maximizes (3.1).
Then, the problem faced by the investors is to design a contract (D, θ) and
an incentive-compatible advice on k that maximize their expected discounted
payoff, subject to a given reservation utility for the bank
vI(u) := sup
(D,θ)
EP
k
[∫ τ
0
(I −Nt)µdt− dDt
]
(3.3)
subject to EP
k
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(dDt +Bkt dt)
]
≥ u
k incentive-compatible with respect to (D, θ) .
This allows us to define a first set of admissible contracts for a given monitoring
advice k
Ak(x) := {(D, θ), θ ∈ [0, 1] is a predictable process, D is positive, càdlàg,
non-decreasing and satisfies (2.3), k is incentive-compatible
with respect to (D, θ) and uk0(D, θ) ≥ x}. (3.4)
Notice that we will put more restrictions on this set at the end of the section.
Using martingale arguments, we now elicit an equivalent condition for the in-
centive compatibility of k. Consider the bank’s expected lifetime utility, condi-
tional on Gt
Ukt (D, θ) := EP
k
[∫ τ
0
e−rs (dDs +Bksds)
∣∣∣ Gt] (3.5)
=
∫ t∧τ
0
e−rs (dDs +Bksds) + e−rtukt (D, θ),
where ukt is the dynamic version of the bank’s continuation utility defined as
ukt (D, θ) := 1{t<τ}EP
k
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t) (dDs +Bksds)
∣∣∣ Gt] . (3.6)
Since we are working with the completed natural filtration of a Poisson process,
and since Ukt is a Gt-martingale under Pk and in L1 because of the integrability
assumptions we made, the martingale representation theorem for point pro-
cesses (see [5], Chapter III, Theorems T9 and T17, and Chapter VI, Theorems
T2 and T3) implies that there are predictable processes h1 and h2 such that
the bank’s continuation utility uk satisfies the following “promise-keeping”
equation until liquidation occurs
dukt + (dDt +Bktdt) = rukt dt− h1t
(
dNt − λkt dt
)
− h2t
(
dHt − (1− θt)λkt dt
)
,
(3.7)
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where the dependence of h1 and h2 on k has been suppressed for notational
convenience. The introduction of these processes provides a practical way of
characterizing contracts for which a given k is incentive-compatible, as shown
in the following proposition, inspired by Sannikov [18]. They have the interpre-
tation of “penalties” weighing down the bank’s continuation utility, the first
upon default (dNt = 1), and the second upon liquidation (dHt = 1).
Proposition 3.2 Given a contract (D, θ) and a shirking process k, the latter
is incentive-compatible if and only if for all t ∈ [0, τ ] and for all i = 1, · · · ,
I −Nt, the following holds almost-surely,(
B
εαI−Nt
− h1t − (1− θt)h2t
)
(kt − i) ≥ 0. (3.8)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary strategy k̂ specifying the number of unmonito-
red loans at any point in time until liquidation. Let ukt denote the continuation
utility in (3.6) resulting from the decision to forgo monitoring k loans at all
times.
Define by
Ût =
∫ t∧τ
0
e−rs
(
dDs +Bk̂sds
)
+ e−rtukt (3.9)
the lifetime utility of the bank viewed as of time t if it follows the strategy k̂
before time t, and plans to switch to k afterwards.
We have for all t ∈ [0, τ ]
dÛt = e−rt
(
dDt +Bk̂tdt
)
+ e−rt
(
dukt − rukt dt
)
= e−rtB(k̂t − kt) dt− e−rt
(
h1t (dNt − λkt dt) + h2t (dHt − (1− θt)λkt dt)
)
= e−rt
(
B − αI−Ntε(h1t + (1− θt)h2t )
)
(k̂t − kt)dt
− e−rt
(
h1t (dNt − λk̂t dt) + h2t (dHt − (1− θt)λk̂t dt)
)
,
where we have used the promise-keeping equation (3.7) for uk. Therefore, the
first term on the right-hand side
e−rt
(
B − αI−Ntε(h1t + (1− θt)h2t )
)
(k̂t − kt),
is the drift of Û under Pk̂. Note also that, by definition, h1 and h2 are integrable
and therefore the martingale part of Û is a true Pk̂-martingale.
(i) Now assume that (3.8) does not hold on a set of positive measure, and
choose k̂ such that it maximizes the quantity(
B − αI−Ntε(h1t + (1− θt)h2t )
)
k̂t,
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for all t. Then, the drift of Û under Pk̂ is non-negative and strictly positive
on a set of positive measure. Therefore Û is a Pk̂-submartingale. This implies
the existence of a time t∗ > 0 such that
EP̂
k
[Ût∗ ] > Û0 = uk0 .
Therefore, if the agent follows this strategy k̂ until the time t∗ and then
switches to the strategy k, his utility is strictly greater than the utility obtai-
ned from following the strategy k all the time. This contradicts the fact that
the strategy k is incentive-compatible.
(ii) With the same notations as above, assume that (3.8) holds for the strategy
k. Then this means that Û is a Pk̂-supermartingale, regardless of the choice
of strategy k̂. Moreover, since Û is positive (because D is non-decreasing), it
has a last element (see Problem 3.16 in [13] for instance). Then, we have by
the optional sampling Theorem
uk0 = Û0 ≥ EP̂
k
[
Ûτ
]
= uk̂0 ,
where we used (3.9) and the fact that ukτ = 0 for the last inequality. This
means that the strategy k maximizes the expected utility of the agent and is
therefore incentive-compatible. 2
Under the assumption that monitoring is efficient, we now focus on contracts
that actually deter the bank from shirking, i.e., contracts with respect to which
k = 0 is incentive-compatible. In that particular case, the above Proposition
can be simplified as follows.
Corollary 3.3 Given a contract (D, θ), k = 0 is incentive-compatible if and
only if
h1t + (1− θt)h2t ≥
B
εαI−Nt
, t ∈ [0, τ ], P− a.s. (3.10)
Remark 3.4 Corollary 3.3 states that, given that the pool has i loans outstan-
ding, in order to induce the bank to monitor all loans, the continuation payoff
must drop in expectation by at least the quantity
bi :=
B
εαi
,
following default.
In order to specify further our admissible strategies, we have to put some
restrictions on h1 and h2. First, we assume that the bank has limited liability.
This means that the bank’s continuation utility is bounded from below by
bI−Nt up to liquidation, since otherwise the incentive-compatible (3.10) would
be violated upon default. In particular, the limited liability constraint must
A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives 11
hold after a default if the pool is maintained in operation (dHt = 0), when the
drop in utility is h1. This implies that
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, u0t− − h1t ≥ bi−1, on {Nt = I − i}. (3.11)
For the second condition, we assume that the bank forfeits any rights to cash
flows once the pool is liquidated. The constraint u0τ = 0 implies in turn that
at all times
u0t− = h1t + h2t , (3.12)
since the drop in utility is h1 + h2 in that case.
The introduction of the processes h1 and h2 allows us to greatly simplify the set
of admissible contracts by formulating the incentive compatibility requirement
in terms of explicit conditions. Our set of admissible strategies is therefore
A˜0(x) := {(D, θ, h1, h2), θ ∈ [0, 1] is predictable, D is positive, càdlàg,
non-decreasing and satisfies (2.3), h1 and h2 are predictable,
integrable and satisfy u0t− − h1t ≥ bI−Nt−1, u0t− = h1t + h2t ,
and x ≤ u00(D, θ).}. (3.13)
Since j = 1 is a degenerate special case, it is convenient to treat monitoring
with a single loan first before turning to the general case.
3.2 Single loan : Constant utility
The default of a single loan ends the game. Hence, there is no room for sto-
chastic liquidation and the processes θ and h2 are left undefined. The incentive
compatibility constraint (3.10) takes the simpler form h1t ≥ b1. However, from
(3.12), ut = h1t on {t < τ}, so the incentive compability constraint can be
rewritten as :
ut ≥ b1, t < τ , P− a.s.
Note that the limited liability constraint is automatically satisfied and that
(3.11) can be disregarded as uτ = 0 upon default. Noting v1(u) the highest
value that an investor can achieve for a given bank’s continuation value of u,
we have the following result.
Proposition 3.5 When j = 1, the value function is given by v1(u) = b1 −
u+ v1 on u ≥ b1, where
v1 :=
µ− b1(r + λ1)
λ1
.
Under the optimal contract, starting from reservation utility u ≥ b1, the incen-
tive compatibility constraint binds at all times until default. The bank receives :
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– An initial lump-sum payment D0 = u − b1 which brings its continuation
utility back to b1,
– A continuous payment dDt = b1(r + λ1) dt until default.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
3.3 Reduction to a stochastic control problem and HJB equations
Let us now turn to the general case j ≥ 2. Under condition (3.10), k = 0 is
incentive-compatible. That being taken care of, solving for the optimal contract
involves maximizing an investor’s expected utility and is therefore a classical
stochastic control problem. Let vj(u) denote the investor’s value function, i.e.,
the maximum expected utility an investor can achieve given a pool of size j
and a reservation utility u for the bank. Assume for now that the process D
is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (we will verify
later that the property is satisfied at the optimum), that is to say
Dt =
∫ t
0
δsds.
We expect the investor’s value function to solve the following system of HJB
equations with initial condition v1(u)
sup
(δ,θ,h1,h2)∈Cj
{(
ru+ λj
(
h1 + (1− θ)h2)− δ) v′j(u) + jµ− δ
−θλj
(
vj(u)− vj−1(u− h1)
)− (1− θ)λjvj(u)} = 0, u ≥ bj ,
(3.14)
where the Cj are our admissible strategies sets defined by
Cj := {δ ≥ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], h1 + (1− θ)h2 ≥ bj , u− h1 ≥ bj−1, u = h1 + h2} .
Remark 3.6 We will see in the next section that our control problem is singu-
lar. Therefore the above HJB equation (3.14) is not exactly the correct one,
and we will consider instead a variational inequality.
Given the constraints in the definition of Cj , we reparametrize the problem in
terms of the variable z := θ(u− h1). This leads to the simpler system of HJB
equations for u ≥ bj
sup
(δ,θ,z)∈C˜j
{
(ru+ λj (u− z)− δ) v′j(u) + jµ− δ − λj(vj(u)− θvj−1(
z
θ
))
}
= 0,
(3.15)
where the constraints become
C˜j :=
{
(δ, θ, z), δ ≥ 0, θ ∈
[
0, 1 ∧ u− bj
bj−1
]
, and z ∈ [bj−1θ, u− bj ]
}
.
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Our strategy now is to guess a candidate optimal contract by solving the above
system of HJB equations, and to prove that the conjectured contract is indeed
optimal by means of a verification argument.
3.3.1 Formal derivation of a candidate optimal contract
Step (i) Optimizing first with respect to δ yields the following variational
inequality for u > bj
min
{
− sup
(θ,z)∈B˜j
{
(ru+ λj (u− z)) v′j(u) + jµ− λj
(
vj(u)− θvj−1
(z
θ
))}
,
v′j(u) + 1
}
= 0. (3.16)
where
B˜j :=
{
(θ, z), θ ∈
[
0, 1 ∧ u− bj
bj−1
]
, and z ∈ [bj−1θ, u− bj ]
}
.
We assume that all the functions vj are concave (a property which needs to
be verified by our candidate). Then the first derivative of vj is decreasing. Let
us also assume that there exists a level γj > bj (a free boundary) such that :
v′j(γj) = −1, v′j(u) > −1, for u < γj .
Then as long as u < γj , vj satisfies the first equation in (3.16). Therefore,
equation (3.16) tells us that the bank cannot receive cash from investors unless
its utility attains the level γj (since δ = 0 is optimal before that). We also
assume (and will verify) that our candidate satisfy for u ≥ γj
sup
(θ,z)∈B˜j
{
(ru+ λj (u− z)) v′j(u) + jµ− λj
(
vj(u)− θvj−1
(z
θ
))}
≤ 0.
This means that vj becomes linear above γj , and that the variational inequality
(3.16) takes the following simpler form. If u ∈ (bj , γj ] then
sup
(θ,z)∈B˜j
{
(ru+ λj (u− z)) v′j(u) + jµ− λj
(
vj(u)− θvj−1
(z
θ
))}
= 0,
and if u > γj
v′j(u) + 1 = 0.
In order to choose γj , it is natural to require our solution to be maximal in
the sense that for each u > bj :
γj −→ vj(u),
is maximal at the chosen value of γj . Of course, it is not clear whether such
a value exists. This heuristic approach can be proven rigorously, and that the
maximality assumption will be clarified.
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Property 3.7 Payments are made to the bank only when its continuation utility
reaches a threshold γj satisfying v′(γj) = −1.
The economic interpretation is as follows. Under the assumed concavity of the
continuation function, its slope v′j(uj) is strictly above −1 as long as total
utility u + vj(u) fails to be maximized. Put differently, it is less expensive
for investors to allow for an increase in the bank’s continuation payoff, which
costs them v′j(uj), than paying the bank right away, which costs them −1.
Compensating the bank with a higher continuation utility rather than cash
implies that payments are deferred (δ = 0). If no default incurs, the bank’s
continuation payoff u keeps increasing as the time set for the resumption of
payments gets closer and closer. It eventually reaches the optimum level γj
(unless a default interrupts the process), at which point the bank is paid. To
this extent, the state variable u can be interpreted as a measure of performance,
with the derivation showing that the optimal compensation scheme must be
based on performance.
Step (ii) We next turn to the liquidation decision. One finds as first-order
condition with respect to θ :
vj−1
(z
θ
)
− z
θ
v′j−1
(z
θ
)
≥ 0. (3.17)
Once again, if vj−1 is concave, the above inequality (3.17) is always verified.
This means that the function
θ −→ θvj−1
(z
θ
)
,
is non-decreasing, which implies that the optimal θ corresponds to its upper
bound. There are then two cases :
(i) u ∈ [bj , bj + bj−1) and θ = (u− bj) /bj−1
(ii) u ∈ [bj + bj−1, γj) and θ = 1.
Property 3.8 Stochastic liquidation takes place in the interval [bj , bj + bj−1),
with controls given by 
δt = 0
θt = (ut − bj) /bj−1
h1t = ut − bj−1
h2t = bj−1
There is no liquidation in the probation interval
[
bj + bj−1, γj
)
.
In the first interval, the pool is liquidated with strictly positive probability
following default. Since bj−1θ = u− bj , the only value left for z is z = u− bj =
bj−1θ, from which we derive h1 = u − bj−1 and h2 = bj−1. Thus, if a default
occurs in that interval, either the bank’s continuation utility drops to the
minimum threshold bj−1 (with probability θ given by the position of u in that
interval) or the pool is liquidated. This actually ensures that the incentive
compatibility condition (3.10) is met, even though under continuation the drop
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in continuation utility u− bj−1 is below the minimum bj required for incentive
purposes. In contrast, there is no liquidation in the interval
[
bj + bj−1, γj
)
,
which we refer to as “probation.” It will be verified that γj ≥ bj + bj−1,
implying that the stochastic liquidation interval has always a width of bj−1.
Step (iii) Finally consider the decision regarding z. We have seen that, if
u ∈ [bj , bj + bj−1), then z = u − bj . On u ∈
[
bj + bj−1, γj
]
, θ = 1 and z is
constrained in the range [bj−1, u− bj ]. We continue our guess of a candidate
solution by assuming that
v′j−1(u− bj)− v′j(u) ≥ 0, (3.18)
a condition which needs to be verified by the resulting candidate. Since vj−1
is supposed to be concave, we have for all z ∈ [bj−1, u− bj ]
v′j−1(z)− v′j(u) ≥ 0. (3.19)
From this, we obtain that the function z −→ −zv′j+vj−1(z) is non-decreasing,
which in turn implies that the supremum over z is attained at u − bj . This
implies in turn that, when u = γj , the dividend payment is δj = ru+ λj(u−
z) = λjbj + rγj .
Property 3.9 The incentive compatibility constraint (3.10) binds on the inter-
val
[
bj + bj−1, γj
]
, and controls are given by
δt = 1{ut=γj}
(
λjbj + rγj
)
θt = 1
h1t = bj
h2t = ut − bj .
Note that the value assigned to h2 is irrelevant, as stochastic liquidation is
never carried out in this interval. The idea behind (3.19) is that, whatever the
choice of z, investor value becomes more sensitive to performance as the bank’s
continuation utility takes a cut following default from u to z. As long as the
difference is positive, the investor is willing to increase z up to its maximum
u − bj , i.e., reduce the penalty to the incentive-compatible level h1 = bj .
Intuitively, it is costly to impose a higher penalty than necessary, because it
would require that the bank be compensated with a higher utility growth under
probation or with higher payments at the threshold γj , which would reduce
investor value. Finally, note that the dividend flow δ has two components.
The first, λjbj = jB/, is proportional to size and can be interpreted as a
monitoring (or servicing) fee. The second, rγj , is tuned to the bank’s rate of
impatience and can be interpreted as a “rent-preserving” fee. The performance-
based compensation scheme resembles that obtained in actual securitization
arrangements, at least when the sponsor retains an equity tranche, with some
important differences that are streamlined in [17].
Summarizing all the above formal calculations, we can finally describe the
contract (D, θ).
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Contract 3.1 For given size j ∈ {1, . . . , I}, let the controls in (3.14) be defi-
ned as :
δj(u) := 1{u=γj}(λjbj + rγj)
θj(u) := 1{bj≤u<bj+bj−1} (u− bj) /bj−1 + 1{bj+bj−1≤u≤γj}
h1,j(u) := (u− bj−1)1{bj≤u<bj+bj−1} + bj1{bj+bj−1≤u≤γj}
h2,j(u) := u− h1,j(u). (3.20)
The corresponding contract can be described as follows :
(i) Given size j, the pool remains in operation (i.e. there is no liquidation)
with one less unit at any time there is a default in the range
[
bj + bj−1, γj
]
.
(ii) The flow of dividend paid to the bank given j is δjt = λjbj + rγj as long
as ut = γj and no default occurs, where δj is the density of D with respect
to the Lebesgue measure. Otherwise δt = 0.
(iii) Liquidation of the pool occurs with probability θjt = (ut − bj) /bj−1 at any
time there is a default in the range [bj , bj + bj−1). If the pool is maintained,
the bank’s continuation utility is reset to its minimum bj−1 consistent with
size j − 1.
Remark 3.10 If the bank’s reservation utility at time 0 is greater than γI , then
the contract should specify that a transfer is immediately made to the bank so
that its utility is brought back to γI . This means that instead of considering
transfers (Dt)t≥0 which are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, we have to add a Dirac mass at 0. This can be readily shown from
the form of the value function vI(u), therefore we will not treat it. Notice that
the contract 3.1 is clearly in A˜0(x).
We end up with the following system of ODEs characterizing the HJB equa-
tions on the interval [bj , γj ]
(ru+ λjbj) v′j(u) + jµ− λj (vj(u)− vj−1(u− bj)) = 0, u ∈
(
bj + bj−1, γj
]
(ru+ λjbj) v′j(u) + jµ− λj
(
vj(u)−u−bjbj−1 vj−1(bj−1)
)
= 0, u ∈ (bj , bj + bj−1] .
We can simplify somewhat the formulation by extending the value function vj
to the interval [0, bj ] as
vj(u) :=
u
bj
vj(bj), u ∈ [0, bj ] , (3.21)
and to the interval (γj ,+∞) as :
vj(u) := vj(γj)− u+ γj .
Then the above system of ODEs becomes :
(ru+ λjbj) v′j(u) + jµ− λj (vj(u)− vj−1(u− bj)) = 0, u ∈
(
bj , γj
]
(3.22)
v′j(u) = −1, u ≥ γj .
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We need to verify that the solution obtained from (3.22) satisfies all the pro-
perties assumed in the derivation of our candidate.
3.3.2 Solving the HJB equations
We now provide conditions under which the heuristic derivation of the pre-
vious section indeed corresponds to a solution of the original system of HJB
equations (3.15). Since we already solved the problem for j = 1, we assume
here that j ≥ 2. Let us define
vj := vj(bj),
and for x > 0 and 0 < β ≤ 1the functions
φβ(x) :=
(
1 + x
1 + (1 + β)x
) 1
x−1
, ψβ(x) :=
φβ(x)− x
(1− x)φβ(x)
.
Remark 3.11 It is easy to show that the functions ψβ can be extended to
continuous functions on R+ which decrease from 1 to 12 and that for all x ≥ 0
ψ1(x) = inf0<β≤1ψβ(x).
We have the following results.
Proposition 3.12 Assume that
r
λj
− 1 ≤ vj−1
bj−1
. (3.23)
(i) The ordinary differential equations (3.22), along with (3.21), have unique
maximal solutions vj for j ≥ 2. The functions vj are globally concave, diffe-
rentiable everywhere except at bj and twice differentiable everywhere except
at bj and bj + bj−1. The endogenous thresholds γj ≥ bj + bj−1 are uniquely
determined by
r
λj
− 1 ∈ ∂vj−1(γj − bj), (3.24)
where ∂vj(u) is the subdifferential of vj at u, and verify
γj ≤ bj + γj−1. (3.25)
(ii) Assume that the λj verify(
v′j−1(b+j−1)
)+ bj−1
vj−1
≤ ψ1
(
r
λj
)
, (3.26)
In that case, the functions vj also verify
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj) ≤ 0, for all u ≥ bj . (3.27)
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The proof is rather tedious and relegated to the Appendix. (See [17] for in-
terpretations.) The technical condition (3.26) restricts the range of admissible
values for {λj}1≤j≤I . The left-hand side reflects the kink of the value function
at bj , and is less than one by concavity. The condition is met for sufficiently
large values of λj , since ψ1 converges to 1 near the origin.
Now since the functions vj constructed in Proposition 3.12 are globally concave,
have a derivative which is greater than −1 for u < γj and equal to −1 for
u ≥ γj and satisfy (3.27), we can apply the heuristic arguments of Section
3.3.1 to obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.13 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.12, the functions vj
constructed in the same Proposition solve the HJB equations (3.14).
Proof. The only remaining property to prove is that for u ≥ γj , we have
− (ru+ λjbj) v′j(u)− jµ+ λj (vj(u)− vj−1(u− bj)) ≥ 0.
We compute
− (ru+ λjbj) v′j(u)− jµ+ λj (vj(u)− vj−1(u− bj))
= ru+ λjbj − jµ+ λj
(
vj(γj)− u+ γj − vj−1(u− bj)
)
= r(u− γj) + λj
(
vj−1(γj − bj) + γj − bj − vj−1(u− bj)− u+ bj
)
≥ r(u− γj)− λj(u− γj)
(
1 + sup
γj−bj≤x≤u−bj
v′j−1(x)
)
≥ r(u− γj)− λj(u− γj)
r
λj
= 0,
where we used the fact that vj−1 is concave, that u→ vj−1(u)+u is increasing
and that v′j−1(γj − bj) ≤ rλj − 1. In particular, this shows that
− sup
(θ,h1,h2)∈Bj
{(
ru+ λj
(
h1 + (1− θ)h2)) v′j(u) + jµ
−λj
(
vj(u)− θvj−1(u− h1)
)} ≥ 0, u ≥ γj . (3.28)
2
3.4 The verification theorem
In this subsection, we prove our main result.
Theorem 3.14 Let u0 ≤ γI be the reservation utility for the bank. Then, the
optimal contract in A˜0(x) for the problem (3.3) is the contract 3.1.
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We decompose the proof in two parts. First, we show that the bank can obtain a
level of utility u0 and the investors vI(u0), for any u0 ≥ bI , with this contract.
The second part, reported in Proposition 3.16, shows that for any contract
(D, θ) which makes the shirking decision k = 0 incentive-compatible, the utility
the investors can obtain is bounded from above by vI(u0), where u0 is the
utility obtained by the bank.
Proposition 3.15 Let the assumptions of Proposition 3.12 hold true. For
any starting condition u0 > bI , we define the process ut as the solution of the
following SDE for j = 0, . . . , I − 1
dut = (rut − δI−Nt(ut)) dt− h1,I−Nt(ut)(dNt − λI−Nt dt)
− h2,I−Nt(ut)(dHt − λI−Nt(1− θI−Nt(ut)) dt), t < τ. (3.29)
Then, the contract defined by
(
δI−Nt(ut), θI−Nt(ut)
)
is incentive-compatible,
has value u0 for the bank and value vI(u0) for the investors.
Proof. First, the drift and volatility in the SDE (3.29) are clearly Lipschitz.
This guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution for all t. Moreover,
it is also clear from the definitions of δI−Nt , θI−Nt , h1,I−Nt and h2,I−Nt that
rut − δI−Nt + λI−Nt
(
h1,I−j(ut) + (1− θI−Nt(ut))h2,I−Nt(ut)
)
≥ 0.
Hence ut remains below γI−Nt . Moreover, when N jumps, we have at the time
of the jump
ut = ut− − h1,I−Nt−t =bI−Nt1bI−N
t−≤ut−<bI−Nt+bI−Nt−
+ (ut− − bNt− )1bI−Nt+bI−Nt−≤ut−≤γI−Nt−
≥bI−Nt .
Therefore, we always have ut ≥ bI−Nt for t < τ . Hence, the process u is
bounded.
Moreover, it is clear by construction that this contract makes the shirking
decision k = 0 incentive-compatible. Indeed, we have after some calculations
for all j
h1,I−Nt(ut) + (1− θI−Nt(ut))h2,I−Nt(ut) = bI−Nt , t < τ,
which is exactly (3.10).
Then, using the equation (3.7) for the continuation utility of the bank obtained
with the contract (δI−Nt(ut), θI−Nt(ut)), we obtain
d
(
e−rt(u0t − ut)
)
= e−rt
(
(h1t − h1,I−Nt)(dNt − λI−Ntdt)
)
+ e−rt
(
(h2t − h2,I−Nt)(dHt − λI−Nt(1− θI−Nt)dt)
)
,
20 Henri Pagès, Dylan Possamaï
where we suppressed the dependance of h1,I−Nt , h2,I−Nt and θI−Nt in u for
simplicity.
Since h1,Nt(ut) and h2,I−Nt(ut) are bounded because ut is bounded and since
h1t and h2t are in the space L1(P) by construction, we can take the conditional
expectation above to obtain
Et
[
u0t+s − ut+s
]
= ers(u0t − ut).
u0 remains bounded, because the δj are bounded for all j (recall (3.6)) and u
is bounded, thus the left-hand side above must remain bounded. Since r > 0,
letting s go to +∞ implies that ut = u0t , P − a.s. and in particular that the
bank overall utility is
u00 = u0.
Let us now turn our attention to the investors. Define
Gt :=
∫ t
0
((I −Ns)µ− δ(us))ds+ vI−Nt(ut), (3.30)
where the vj are those defined in Proposition 3.12. Consider the interval [τ j ∧
τ , τ j+1 ∧ τ). We have shown before that ut remains above bI−j . But we know
by construction that vI−j is continuous on [bI−j ,+∞) and has a derivative
which can be continuously extended on [bI−j ,+∞). Hence we can apply the
change of variable formula for locally bounded processes (see [8], Chapter VI,
Section 92) to obtain for all t ≥ 0
Gt = vI(u0) +
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
(I − j)µ− δI−j(us) + v′I−j(us)(rus − δI−j(us))ds
+
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
λI−jv′I−j(us)
(
h1,I−j(us) + (1− θI−j(us))h2,I−j(us)
)
ds
+
I−1∑
j=0
∑
τj∧t≤s≤τj+1∧t
vI−j(us)− vI−j(us−). (3.31)
Let us decompose the jumps of vj . We have
vj(us)− vj(us−) =∆Ns
(
(1−∆Hs) vj−1
(
us− − h1,j(us−)
)− vj (us−))
=∆Ns
(
vj−1
(
us− − h1,j(us−)
)− vj (us−))
−∆Hsvj−1
(
us− − h1,j(us−)
)
,
which implies that
τj+1∧t∑
s=τj∧t
vI−j(us)−vI−j(us− ) =
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
(vI−j−1(us−−h1,I−j(us− ))−vI−j(us−))dNs
−
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
vI−j−1
(
us− − h1,I−j(us−)
)
dHs.
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From this, we obtain
Gt = vI(u0) +
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
(I − j)µ− δI−j(us) + v′I−j(us)(rus − δI−j(us))ds
+
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
λI−jv′I−j(us)
(
h1,I−j(us) + (1− θI−j(us))h2,I−j(us)
)
ds
+
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
λI−j
(
vI−j−1
(
us − h1,I−j(us)
)− vI−j (us)) ds
−
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
λI−j(1− θI−j)vI−j−1
(
us − h1,I−j(us)
)
ds
+
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
(
vI−j−1
(
us− − h1,I−j(us−)
)− vI−j (us−)) (dNs − λI−jds)
−
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
vI−j−1
(
us− − h1,I−j(us−)
) (
dHs − λI−j(1− θI−j(us−))ds
)
.
Using the fact that the vj solve the HJB equation 3.22, we deduce that
Gt = vI(u0) +
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
vI−j−1
(
us− − h1,I−j(us−)
)
(dNs − λI−jds)
−
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
vI−j (us−) (dNs − λI−jds)
−
I−1∑
j=0
∫ τj+1∧t
τj∧t
vI−j−1
(
us− − h1,I−j(us−)
) (
dHs − λI−j(1− θI−j(us−))ds
)
.
(3.32)
Hence, G is a bounded martingale until time τ (since δ is bounded by definition
and ut and thus the vj(ut) are also bounded) and we have, since uτ = 0
E
[∫ τ
0
((I −Nt)µ− δt) dt
]
= E[Gτ ] = G0 = vI(u0),
which is the desired result. 2
We now show that vI(u0) is an upper bound for the utility the investor can
obtain from any contract which makes the shirking decision k = 0 incentive-
compatible.
Proposition 3.16 For any contract (D, θ) ∈ A˜0(u0), the utility the investors
can obtain is bounded from above by vI(u0), where u0 is the utility obtained by
the bank.
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Proof. We define as in the previous proof the quantity Gt for an arbitrary
contract (δ, θ). By applying the change of variable formula and arguing exactly
as before we can obtain that the drift of G is actually negative, using again
(3.14). Indeed, we know that for any (D, θ, h1, h2) ∈ A˜0(u0), we have from
Corollary 3.13 and its proof that for all j(
rut + λj
(
h1t + (1− θt)h2t
))
v′j(ut) + jµ− λj
(
vj(ut)− θtvj−1(ut − h1t )
) ≤ 0,
and we know that
−(v′j(ut) + 1)dDt ≤ 0,
since D is non-decreasing.
Hence, using again (3.32), we have
Gt∧τ ≤ vI(u) +
∫ τ∧t
0
(
vI−Ns−1
(
us− − h1,I−Nss
)− vI−Ns (us−))(dNs−λI−Nsds)
−
∫ τ∧t
0
vI−Ns−1
(
us− − h1,I−Nss
) (
dHs − λI−Ns(1− θI−Nss )ds
)
.
(3.33)
Now we have
E
[∫ τ∧t
0
∣∣vI−Ns−1 (us − h1,I−Nss )− vI−Ns (us)∣∣ ds]
≤ E
[∫ τ∧t
0
∣∣vI−Ns−1 (us − h1,I−Nss )− vI−Ns−1 (us − bI−Ns)∣∣ ds]
+ E
[∫ τ∧t
0
|vI−Ns−1 (us − bI−Ns)− vI−Ns (us)| ds
]
Then, from (3.27), we know that for all j the function u −→ vj(u)−vj−1(u−bj)
is decreasing. Moreover, for u large enough (namely u ≥ γj ∨ (γj−1 + bj)) we
have
vj(u)− vj−1(u− bj) = vj(γj) + γj − vj−1(γj−1) + γj−1 − bj ,
which implies that for all j the function u −→ vj(u)−vj−1(u−bj) is bounded.
Moreover, we have
E
[∫ τ∧t
0
∣∣vI−Ns−1 (us − h1,I−Ns)− vI−Ns−1 (us − bI−Ns)∣∣ ds]
≤ E
[∫ τ∧t
0
∣∣h1,I−Nss − bI−Ns∣∣ sup
bI−Ns<u≤γI−Ns
∣∣v′I−Ns(u)∣∣ ds
]
≤ C
(
1 + E
[∫ τ∧t
0
|us| ds
])
≤ C
(
1 + E
[∫ τ∧t
0
ue(r+2λ)sds
])
< +∞,
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where λ := sup
1≤j≤I
λj , and where we used successively the fact that the derivative
of the vj can be extended to a continuous function on [bj , γj ] which is therefore
bounded on that compact, then the fact that by the limited liability condition
(3.11) we have h1t ≤ ut, and finally that conditionally on the fact that there
are j loans left in the pool, the drift of ut as given by (3.7) is
rut + λj
(
h1t + (1− θt)h2t
)− δt ≤ rut + λj (h1t + (1− θt)(ut − h1t ))
≤ rut + λj (ut − bj−1 + (1− θt)ut))
≤ ut(r + 2λj),
where we used the fact that h, bj and λj are positive. Hence, ut increases at
a rate lower than r + 2λ.
Similarly, we have
E
[∫ τ∧t
0
∣∣vI−Ns−1 (us− − h1,I−Nss )∣∣ ds]
≤ E
[∫ τ∧t
0
∣∣h2,I−Nss ∣∣ sup
bI−Ns<u≤γI−Ns
∣∣v′I−Ns−1(u)∣∣ ds
]
≤ E
[∫ τ∧t
0
|us| sup
bI−Ns<u≤γI−Ns
∣∣v′I−Ns−1(u)∣∣ ds
]
< +∞.
Taking expectations in (3.33), we therefore obtain
vI(u0) ≥E
[∫ τ
0
((I −Ns)µ− δs) ds
]
+ E
[
1t<τ
(∫ τ
t
(δs − (I −Ns)µ) ds+ vI−Nt(ut)
)]
=E
[∫ τ
0
((I −Ns)µ− δs) ds
]
+ E
[
1t<τEt
[∫ τ
t
(δs − (I −Ns)µ) ds+ vI−Nt(ut)
]]
=E
[∫ τ
0
((I −Ns)µ− δs) ds
]
+ E
[
1t<τ
(
ut + vI−Nt(ut)− Et
[∫ τ
t
(I −Ns)µds
])]
≥E
[∫ τ
0
((I −Ns)µ− δs) ds
]
+ E [1t<τ (−Iµτ + ut + vI−Nt(ut))] .
(3.34)
Then, we know that for all j the function u −→ u+ vj(u) is increasing before
γj and is constant for u ≥ γj . It is therefore bounded and we have
|−Iµτ + ut + vI−Nt(ut)| ≤ Iµτ + sup
1≤j≤I
∣∣γj + vj(γj)∣∣ ≤ C(1 + τ),
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for some positive constant C. This quantity being integrable, we can apply the
dominated convergence theorem in (3.34) and let t go to +∞ to obtain
vI(u0) ≥ E
[∫ τ
0
((I −Ns)µ− δs) ds
]
,
which is the desired result. 2
3.5 Numerical results
In this section we present some numerical results to illustrate our main pro-
perties. Following the empirical estimates of [16], we choose to work with a
pool of I = 30 loans with :
µ 0.06
r 0.02
B 0.002
ε 0.25
(αj)1≤j≤20 0.055
(αj)21≤j≤26 0.05
(αj)27≤j≤30 0.044.
Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 are satisfied. The values assigned to αj and  are
consistent with the literature. The former are assumed piecewise constant to
model a surge in the default intensity after a certain fraction of the pool has
defaulted. The bank’s discount rate and the yield of the loans are taken close
to what could be deemed standard in financial markets.
Using the fact that the vj have a semi-explicit form, we use numerical integra-
tions techniques to obtain the functions vj for j = 1, . . . , 30. Condition (3.26)
of Proposition 3.12 is always verified. As shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.5, both
the value functions vj and the thresholds γj appear to be increasing with j.
Note that the contract between the bank and the investors generates a positive
social surplus, given by
v30(γ30) + γ30 − 30 = 1.86.
With competitive investors, the full surplus is extracted by the bank in the
form of expected profits. We have v30(γ30) = 29.88 in this numerical example.
Since investors must break even, the bank does not have the wherewithal to
go for the project on its own. The capital that it has to invest corresponds to
roughly 0.4% of the total amount. By construction, it is the stake that it is
willing to invest at time 0 in order to maximize its profits from the pool. Note
that from (2.6) the surplus available under the first-best is S = 4.48. About
58% of value is lost due to the agency problem.
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Figure 3.1 Functions vj(u) for j = 2..30.
Figure 3.2 Values of γj for j = 1..30.
4 What happens when r = 0 ?
In this section, we relax the assumption that the bank is impatient. A positive
discount rate implies that there are gains from trades, as the bank is eager to
sell claims on future cash flows to more patient investors. This is precisely what
creates the moral hazard problem, as gains from trades can be undermined by
high default rates when the bank shirks. We will see that, in contrast, the
first-best is attained when r = 0. Proofs are quite similar and only sketched.
The analog of Proposition 3.12 is as follows.
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Proposition 4.1 Assume that r = 0.
(i) The ordinary differential equations (3.22), along with (3.21), have unique
maximal solutions vj for j ≥ 1. The functions vj are globally concave, diffe-
rentiable everywhere except at bj and twice differentiable everywhere except
at bj and bj + bj−1. The endogenous thresholds γj are uniquely determined
by
γj =
jB
αj
. (4.1)
(ii) We also have
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj) ≤ 0, for all u ≥ bj . (4.2)
Proof. (i) When r = 0, the solution of (3.22) for a given γ ≥ bj is
vj(u) =
jµ
λj
+ e
u−γ
bj (vj−1(γ − bj)− bj) +
∫ γ
u
e
u−x
bj
bj
vj−1(x− bj)dx, bj < u ≤ γ
(4.3)
vj(u) = γ − u+ vj(γ), u > γ.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.12, it is easily
proved that the choice of γ leading to the maximum solution is
γj = γj−1 + bj .
Reasoning by induction, we can then prove similarly that the functions vj
verify all the desired properties. Moreover, since γ1 = b1, we obtain that
γj =
j∑
i=1
bi =
jB
αj
.
(ii) We can prove that
v′j(u) =
∫ γj
u
e
u−x
bj
bj
dvj−1
du
(x− bj)dx− e
u−γj
bj , bj < u ≤ γj
dvj
du
(u) = −1, u > γj .
By the concavity of vj−1, this implies that for bj < u ≤ γj
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj) ≤ −e
u−γj
bj
(
v′j−1(u− bj) + 1
) ≤ 0.
Since (4.2) is clear when u > γj , this proves (ii). 2
Thanks to Proposition 4.1, we have a concave solution of the HJB equation,
then using the same techniques as in the case r > 0, we can verify that the
optimal contract is given by
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Contract 4.1 When r = 0, the optimal contract can be described as follows :
(i) If, at some point, ut = γj, there is no longer any stochastic liquidation.
Fees are paid continuously to the bank, until extinction of the pool, at the
rate δit = iB/ for all i ≤ j.
(ii) Otherwise, the policy is the same as in contract 3.1 (with r = 0).
When the bank starts with reservation utility γI (which is the market outcome
when investors are competitive), payments are never suspended since the bank
always operates at the thresholds γj where payments are made. Hence, there
can be no stochastic liquidation. More specifically, we have
vj(γj) =
jµ
λj
− bj + vj−1(γj−1),
implying that the social value of the contract is
γI + vI(γI) = γI +
I
αI
(
µ− B

)
= Iµ
αI
.
But according to (2.6) this is the social value attained in the first-best. Hence,
when the bank is infinitely patient, the first-best is attained. For each j, the
bank captures the maximum value of its rent,
∑
{i≤j} bi, but this is not socially
costly since there is no loss arising from any “rent-preserving” fee.
Note that, to make the problem interesting, we have assumed that investments
are not self-financing. Otherwise, the bank would be free to invest arbitrarily
large amounts and there would be no demand for investors’ liquidity. This
means that
vI(γI) < I. (4.4)
In the general case, such a condition is difficult to work out, but when r = 0
it is easily shown to be
µ− B
ε
< αI .
This yields a lower bound for B. The moral hazard problem has to be severe
enough that there is a funding problem. In the general case, we expect that
the equivalent of (4.4) is going to hold for some lower bound on B (which will
depend on r).
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A Appendix
Démonstration (Proof of Proposition 3.5) In this particular case, Problem (3.3) becomes
v1(u) = sup
D
EP
[∫ τ
0
µdt− dDt
]
(A.1)
subject to EP
[∫ τ
0
e−rt dDt
]
≥ u
ut ≥ b1, for all t < τ.
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Consider first the subproblem derived from (A.1) by abstracting from the initial payment
D0 and ignoring the incentive compatibility constraint ut ≥ b1 :
v˜1(u) = sup
D
EP
[∫ τ
0+
µdt− dDt
]
subject to EP
[∫ τ
0+
e−rt dDt
]
≥ u.
The constraint can be written equivalently
EP
[∫ τ
0+
e−rt (dDt − (r + λ1)u dt)
]
≥ 0.
The corresponding Lagrangian is
Lt = µdt− dDt + νte−rt (dDt − u(r + λ1) dt) ,
where νt is the Lagrange multiplier at time t. Optimizing with respect to D, we get νt = ert
and the complementary slackness conditions imply that the dividend process is absolutely
continuous and constant, namely dDt = δt dt, with δt = (r+λ1)u. Since the process D thus
obtained is clearly admissible, this yields v˜1(u) = (µ− (r + λ1)u) /λ1.
Turning now to (A.1), but still ignoring the incentive compatibility constraint, we have
v1(u) = sup
D0
−D0 + v˜1(u−D0),
which is increasing in D0 when r > 0. Since u0 = u−D0 from the bank’s promise-keeping
constraint (3.7), the highest initial payment consistent with the incentive compatibility
constraint at time 0 is D0 = u− b1. This yields
v1(u) = b1 − u+ v˜1(b1)
= b1 − u+ v1,
where v1 is defined as in the Proposition. Finally, one verifies that δt = b1(r + λ1) yields
ut = b1 on [0, τ), so that the incentive compatibility condition binds at all times before
default, as desired. unionsqu
Démonstration (Proof of Proposition 3.12(i)) We will show the result by induction.
– Initialization with j = 2
The solution of the ODE (3.22) for j = 2 and a given fixed value of γ ≥ b2 can be easily
calculated and is given by
v˜2(u, γ) := (ru+ λ2b2)
λ2
r
∫ γ
u
2µ+ λ2v1(x− b2)
(rx+ λ2b2)
λ2
r
+1
dx
+
(
v1(γ − b2) + 2µ− (rγ + λ2b2)
λ2
)(
ru+ λ2b2
rγ + λ2b2
)λ2
r
, b2 < u ≤ γ,
and v˜2(u, γ) = γ − u+ v2(γ) for u > γ.
Now since we have shown that v1 is everywhere twice differentiable except at b1, we have
for every γ 6= b1 + b2 and every b2 < u ≤ γ
∂v˜2
∂γ
(u, γ) =
(
v′1(γ − b2) + 1−
r
λ2
)((
ru+ λ2b2
rγ + λ2b2
)λ2
r
1u≤γ + 1u>γ
)
.
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Thus, the above expression always has the sign of v′1(γ − b2) + 1− rλ2 , that is to say that it
is positive for γ < b1+ b2 and negative for γ > b1+ b2. Hence, we clearly have for all b2 < u
sup
γ≥b2
v˜2(u, γ) = v˜2(u, b1 + b2),
which means that the maximal solution of (3.22) for j = 2 corresponds to the choice γ2 =
b1 + b2, which also happens to correspond to the unique solution of
r
λ2
− 1 ∈ ∂v1(γ2 − b1).
Then, after some calculations, we obtain that for all b2 < u < b1 + b2
v′′2 (u) = −
(
λ2 − r + λ2 v1
b1
) (ru+ λ2b2)λ2r −1
(r(b1 + b2) + λ2b2)
λ2
r
≤ 0,
because of (3.23).
Hence, since v2, is linear on [b1 + b2,+∞) and is differentiable at b1 + b2, it is concave on
(b2,+∞). Now if we consider the linear extrapolation of v2 over [0, b1] by (3.21), we just
need to verify that the left-derivative of v2 at b2 is less than its right-derivative to obtain the
concavity of v2 over [0,+∞]. Taking the limit for u ↓ b2 in the equation (3.22), we obtain
v′2(b
+
2 ) =
λ2v2 − 2µ
b2(r + λ2)
.
This implies that
v′2(b
−
2 )− v′2(b+2 ) =
2µ
b2λ2
+ v′2(b
+
2 )
r
λ2
≥ µ
B
− r
λ2
.
Now recall Assumption 2.2, which implies that
r
λj
<
r
αj
≤ µ−B
B

1 + 
<
µ
B
for any j so that v′2(b
−
2 )− v′2(b+2 ) ≥ 0.
– Heredity : j ≥ 3
Let us now suppose that the maximal solution of (3.22) vj−1 has been constructed for some
j ≥ 3, that it is globally concave on [0,+∞), everywhere differentiable except at bj−1,
everywhere twice differentiable except at bj−1 and bj−1+ bj−2, and that the corresponding
γj−1 ≥ bj−1+bj−2. Let us now construct the maximal solution corresponding to j. Exactly
as in the case j = 2, the solution of the ODE (3.22) and a given fixed value of γ ≥ bj can
be easily calculated and is given by
v˜j(u, γ) :=(ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
∫ γ
u
jµ+ λjvj−1(x− bj)
(rx+ λjbj)
λj
r
+1
dx
+
(
vj−1(γ − bj) +
jµ− (rγ + λjbj)
λj
)(
ru+ λjbj
rγ + λjbj
)λj
r
, bj < u ≤ γ,
and v˜j(u, γ) = γ − u+ vj(γ) for u > γ.
Note also that from (3.22) it is clear that vj is differentiable everywhere except at bj , and
twice differentiable everywhere except at bj and bj + bj−1.
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Now since we assumed that vj−1 is everywhere differentiable except at bj−1, we have for
every γ 6= bj−1 + bj and every bj < u ≤ γ
∂v˜j
∂γ
(u, γ) =
(
v′j−1(γ − bj) + 1−
r
λj
)( ru+ λjbj
rγ + λjbj
)λj
r
1u≤γ + 1u>γ
 .
Thus, since vj−1 is concave and its derivative non-increasing, we can conclude as in the case
j = 2 that the maximal solution is uniquely determined by the choice γj which corresponds
to the solution of r
λj
− 1 ∈ ∂vj−1(γj − bj).
More precisely, using (3.23), we have only two cases. Either,
v′j−1(b
+
j−1) ≤
r
λj
− 1 ≤ vj−1
bj−1
,
and γj = bj−1 + bj , or
r
λj
− 1 < v′j−1(b+j−1),
and bj−1 + bj < γj ≤ γj−1 + bj .
Let us now study the concavity. We can differentiate twice the equation (3.22) on (bj , bj +
bj−1) since vj−1(u − bj) is linear and thus twice differentiable on this open interval. We
then obtain easily
v′′j (u) = v′′j ((bj + bj−1)−)
(
ru+ λjbj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
)λj
r
−2
, bj < u < bj + bj−1. (A.2)
There are then two cases. If γj = bj + bj−1, differentiating once (3.22) and then taking the
limit u ↑ bj + bj−1, we get
(r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj)v′′j ((bj + bj−1)−) = λj
(
r
λj
− 1− vj−1
bj−1
)
≤ 0.
Since v′′j (u) = 0 for u > bj + bj1 , we have proved the concavity on (bj ,+∞).
Now if γj > bj+bj−1, differentiating once (3.22) and taking limits on both sides of bj+bj−1,
we obtain
v′′j ((bj+bj−1)+)−v′′j ((bj+bj−1)−) =
λj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
(
vj−1
bj−1
− v′j−1(b+j−1)
)
, (A.3)
where the right-hand side is positive by the concavity of vj−1.
Next, we differentiate twice (3.22) on (bj + bj−1, γj ]. We obtain easily
v′′j (u) = λj(ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
−2
∫ γj
u
v′′j−1(x− bj)
(ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
−1
dx. (A.4)
Note that we should normally distinguish between the cases bj + bj−1 + bj−2 ≤ γj or not,
since vj−1 is not twice differentiable at bj−1+bj−2. However, since we know that vj is twice
differentiable at bj + bj−1 + bj−2, this actually does not change the result. Since vj−1 is
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concave, (A.4) implies that vj is concave on (bj + bj−1,+∞). Then with (A.3) we obtain
that the left second derivative of vj at bj + bj−1 is negative, which, thanks to (A.2) shows
finally the concavity on (bj ,+∞).
Finally, it remains to show that v′j(b
+
j ) ≤
vj
bj
. We take the limit for u ↓ bj in the equation
(3.22), we obtain
v′j(b
+
j ) =
λjvj − jµ
bj(r + λj)
.
Since v′j ≥ −1, this implies that
v′j(b
−
j )− v′j(b+j ) =
jµ
bjλj
+ v′j(b
+
j )
r
λj
≥ µ
B
− r
λj
,
which has already been shown to be positive under Assumption 2.2. Hence vj is concave on
[0,+∞). unionsqu
Démonstration (Proof of Proposition 3.12(ii)) First of all, by the properties of the function
ψ1 recalled in Remark 3.11, it is clear that we can always find a λj such that (3.26) is
satisfied. Then, if for a fixed j ≥ 2 we have v′j−1(b+j−1) ≤ 0, by differentiating (3.22), we
immediately have for u > bj and u 6= bj + bj−1
λj
(
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj)
)
= (ru+ λjbj)v′′j (u) + rv′j(u). (A.5)
Since we have proved in (i) that the vj are concave, it is clear that if v′j−1(b
+
j−1) ≤ 0, the
right-hand side above is negative. Then by left and right continuity of v′j−1 at bj−1, the
result extends to u = bj + bj−1. Hence the desired property (3.27). In particular, this proves
the result for j = 2 since v′1(b
+
1 ) = −1.
Note also that the property (3.27) clearly holds for vj when u > γj . Indeed, we have
v′j = −1
and we know that the derivative of vj−1 is always greater than −1.
Let us now show the rest of the result by induction. Since (3.27) is true for j = 2, let us fix
a j ≥ 3 and assume that
v′j−1(u)− v′j−2(u− bj−1) ≤ 0, u > bj−1. (A.6)
Now if v′j−1(b
+
j−1) ≤ 0, we already know that the property 3.27 is true for vj , so we will
assume that v′j−1(b
+
j−1) > 0. Moreover, by our remark above, we know that (3.27) holds
true for vj when u > γj . Let us then first prove that (3.27) for vj when u > bj + bj−1.
If γj = bj + bj−1, there is nothing to do. Otherwise, we have using successively (A.5) and
(A.4)
λj
(
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj)
)
= (ru+ λjbj)v′′j (u) + rv′j(u)
= (ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
−1
∫ γj
u
λjv
′′
j−1(x− bj)
(rx+ λjbj)
λj
r
−1
dx+ rv′j(u). (A.7)
Now if we differentiate (3.22) and solve the corresponding ODE for v′j , we obtain
v′j(u) = (ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
−1
∫ γj
u
λjv
′
j−1(x− bj)
(rx+ λjbj)
λj
r
dv −
(
ru+ λjbj
rγj + λjbj
)λj
r
−1
. (A.8)
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Using (A.8) in (A.7), we obtain for u > bj + bj−1
λj
(
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj)
)
= λj(ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
−1
∫ γj
u
(rx+ λjbj)v′′j−1(x− bj) + rv′j−1(x− bj)
(rx+ λjbj)
λj
r
dv
− r
(
ru+ λjbj
rγj + λjbj
)λj
r
−1
. (A.9)
Then we have for all x ≥ u > bj + bj−1 and x 6= bj + bj−1 + bj−2
(rx+ λjbj)v′′j−1(x− bj) + rv′j−1(x− bj) = (r(x− bj) + λj−1bj−1)v′′j−1(x− bj)
+ (λjbj − λj−1bj−1 + rbj) v′′j−1(x− bj)
+ rv′j−1(x− bj)
= λj−1
(
v′j−1(x− bj)− v′j−2(x− bj − bj−1)
)
+ (λjbj − λj−1bj−1 + rbj) v′′j−1(x− bj)
≤ (λjbj − λj−1bj−1 + rbj) v′′j−1(x− bj),
where we used the induction hypothesis (A.6) in the last inequality.
Since vj−1 is concave, the sign of the right-hand side above is given by the sign of
λjbj − λj−1bj−1 + rbj = JB
ε
− (J − 1)B
ε
+ rbj =
B
ε
+ rbj ≥ 0.
Reporting this in (A.9) implies
v′j(u)− v′j−1(u− bj) ≤ 0, u > bj + bj−1.
It remains to prove (3.27) when bj < u < bj + bj−1. In that case, (3.27) can be written
v′j(u)−
vj−1
bj−1
≤ 0, bj < u < bj + bj−1,
which is equivalent by concavity of vj to
v′j(b
+
j )−
vj−1
bj−1
≤ 0.
Now using (A.8), we also have
v′j(b
+
j ) = (ru+ λjbj)
λj
r
−1
∫ bj+bj−1
bj
λj
vj−1
bj−1
(rx+ λjbj)
λj
r
dv
+ v′j−1(bj + bj−1)
(
ru+ λjbj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
)λj
r
−1
=
vj−1
bj−1
λj
λj − r
1−( rbj + λjbj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
)λj
r
−1

+ v′j−1(bj + bj−1)
(
ru+ λjbj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
)λj
r
−1
.
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And thus
v′j(b
+
j ) ≤
vj−1
bj−1
λj
λj − r
1−( rbj + λjbj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
)λj
r
−1

+ v′j−1(b
+
j−1)
(
ru+ λjbj
r(bj + bj−1) + λjbj
)λj
r
−1
= φ bj−1
bj
(
r
λj
)
vj−1
bj−1
 φ bj−1bj
(
r
λj
)
− 1
φ bj−1
bj
(
r
λj
)
(x− 1)
+
v′j−1(b
+
j−1)
vj−1
bj−1
 ,
which implies
v′j(b
+
j )−
vj−1
bj−1
≤ φ bj−1
bj
(
r
λj
)
vj−1
bj−1
(
v′j−1(b
+
j−1)
vj−1
bj−1
− ψ bj−1
bj
(
r
λj
))
.
By Assumption 2.3, we know that bj ≥ bj−1, hence with (3.26) and what we recalled earlier
about the functions ψβ in Remark 3.11, we have
vj−1
bj−1
≤ ψ
(
r
λj
)
≤ ψ bj−1
bj
(
r
λj
)
,
which implies the desired property and ends the proof.
unionsqu
